Field Tactics and Weapons

Three weeks had passed since the attack on Washington ; however, Baltimoreans were not sitting by idly, for the Committee of Vigilance and Safety began to act. At the request of Baltimore Mayor, Edward Johnson, the Committee requested that Major General Samuel Smith, a Revolutionary War veteran, take overall command of Baltimore ’s defenses. Smith, unlike Winder, took appropriate military action with regard to training his militia troops and erecting defenses. However, with Smith being a militia officer and Winder being that of a regular officer, Smith worried about a confrontation over command.  Due to the incompetent military leadership displayed prior to the Battle of Bladensburg, Smith received permission from the Maryland ’s capital at Annapolis to take over command as a federally appointed Major General. The order read, “by the requisition of the President of the United States of the 4^th of July last, one Major General is required of this state, in conformity to which, you have been selected.”20   

Samuel Smith set out to create a defensive works so strong that it would deter any force from trying to breach it. General Smith perceived that the British assault would be one of an amphibious nature and would come from the East up the Patpasco River . According to historian Joseph A. Whitehorne, the river was “dissected by creeks and estuaries flowing into the river made any rapid movement of a large force impossible.”21

Therefore, Sam Smith realized that there was no other alternative but to land an amphibious force at North Point was the Philadelphia road that ran east moving out of the city of Baltimore .  Bearing southeast from the Philadelphia Road was Trappe Road that ran into Long Log Lane. It had appeared to Smith that this would be the avenue of approach used by the British land force. The Committee of Public Supply aided Smith erecting defenses on the east side of the city. An order went out from the Committee of Vigilance back on August 24, calling on all citizens to bring with them all available shovels, wheel-barrows, pick-axes and spades. The line of earthworks extended from Broad Street across Hampstead Hill and anchored itself on the Patpasco near the mouth of Harris Creek . In addition to the earthworks, an artillery park containing about fifty pieces of ordinance was created. Across the Patpasco, sat Fort McHenry , whose guns could also provide support to Smith’s position. On Hampstead Hill, Commodore Rodgers and Perry were stationed, hence the name Rodgers Bastion which was given to the position on the Hill that was situated above the main earthworks.22

          In a dispatch from Sir Alexander Cochrane to Major General Robert Ross dated September 12, 1814 , Cochrane indicates that from his position four miles from Fort McHenry , there were many preparations being made by awaiting Americans. Cochrane indicates that, “the enemy have been sinking ships across their harbour all day, and in front of the fort. They have a number of men at work to the NE-of town upon the ground which forms a kind of irregular ridge.”23 Cochrane continued to relay to Ross that the defenders were erecting breastworks and redoubts at various points along the ridge. Cochrane was referring to the primary American defensive line that ran across the ridge on Hampstead Hill and the large redoubt known as Rodgers Bastion.24

            It was in the early morning hours of September 12, when British soldiers and marines began to load into rowboats where they were lowered, and thereby, ferried to the shore at the tip of North Point. Lieutenant George Robert Glieg noted the precautions that were being taken during the disembarkation and he indicated that the guns from a number of brigs were pointed to the shore and that craft carrying the soldiers and marines were armed with carronades.25  It was 7:00 a.m. before all the ground troops were landed and were preparing to advance towards their objective. The disembarkation took four hours and leading the Light Brigade, was a Major Timothy Jones of Her Majesty’s 4^th Regiment. The Light Brigade consisted of the 85^th Light Infantry Regiment along with the light companies of the 4^th, 44^th and 21^st Regiments of Foot. Following the light brigade’s advance, were six field pieces and two howitzers. Following the artillery was the Second Brigade under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Mullins and it consisted of the 4^th Regiment, 44^th Regiment along with a contingent of Marines and the Naval Landing Party. Finally, the Third Brigade was lead by Lieutenant Colonel William Patterson and within the brigade was the regiment of Major John H. Whitaker (21^st Regiment) and 2^nd Battalion of Royal Marines under the command of Major George Lewis. While Ross’s army was in motion, flanking parties were deployed in order to cover its movement.26

            At 7:00 a.m. , reports had come in from General Stricker’s cavalry scouts that Ross’s army had landed at North Point. The Light Brigade was advancing towards a farm owned by Robert Gorsuch. Prior to hearing these reports, General Smith reacted to the news of the British landing by dispatching what was considered the best-trained troops making-up part of the defense of Baltimore, the Third Brigade under the command General Stricker. The third brigade consisted of the following infantry regiments: 5^th, 6^th, 27^th, 39^th and 51^st. There were four companies of cavalry that made up the 5^th Maryland Militia Cavalry Regiment, along with the 1^st Regiment of Maryland Artillery containing six four pounders and a battalion of riflemen consisting of three companies. The third brigade was ordered by General Smith to advance from the Philadelphia Road onto Long Log Lane, with the intentions of delaying Ross’s army and impeding his movement. According to historian Joseph A. Whitehorne, the land was flat and rather marshy with some woodland’s that provided concealment to Stricker’s position with zigzag fence lines to the front. Ross’s army would have to advance through open farm fields dotted by haystacks and owned by the Bouldin family. According to Frederick M. Colston, “the ground was well chosen, with the right resting on Bear Creek and the left near Bread and Cheese Creek.”27 On the left of Long Log Lane, Stricker posted the 27^th Regiment along with the Union Artillery straddling the road. To the right of the road sat the 5th Maryland Regiment with riflemen posted towards Bear creek. Farther in the rear of the main line, were the 39^th and 51^st Regiments with the 6^th being held in reserve near Cook’s Tavern. Around 8:00 p.m. , Stricker’s advanced force consisting of about 3,000 men, were establishing a bivouac along the Long Log Lane below the Trappe Road . While Stricker’s army camped overnight, he dispatched a mounted force from the 5^th Maryland Cavalry Regiment under the command of Lieutenant Colonel James Biays. The force consisted of about 140 troopers and reached a position about a mile from the Gorsuch’s Farm. The mounted force was supported by the Fell’s Point Riflemen who were under the command of Captain William D. Dyer’s. Dyer established a skirmish line at a blacksmith shop about one mile to the rear of Biay’s cavalry contingent.28

            After the light brigade had reached the shore, Ross wanted to move forward in order to conduct a reconnaissance mission. Colonel Arthur Brooke, who was General Ross’s second in command, was ordered to await the disembarkation of the rest of the army. Summertime in the Chesapeake can bring with it many a sultry day and as the soldiers of the light brigade advanced carrying their cartridge boxes, haversack, flintlock musket along with other necessary equipment along with donning a rather uncomfortable woolen uniform, soldiers began to succumb to heat exhaustion. Ross, accompanied by Admiral Cockburn, were about five miles from where Colonel Brooke was overseeing the completion of the army’s disembarkation when they decided to halt at the Gorsuch farmhouse and enjoy breakfast at the expenses of the Gorsuch family. Mr. Gorsuch inquired as to whether or not he should prepare supper for Ross’s return trip, at which point, Ross supposedly stated ‘ “I’ll sup in Baltimore tonight-or in hell.” ’

             The corps of riflemen, who were dispatched earlier by Stricker were, to conduct operations to impede the movement of the British land forces. Rumors were spreading that a flanking force had landed in the rear of the forward rifle unit at the Back River and in fear of being cut off from the main body, the riflemen conducted a hasty retreat. At the same time, Ross was reconnoitering a position about three miles from the landing on the point. Ross’s light units came in contact with Stricker’s cavalrymen who deployed as an observation unit. As the cavalrymen were going to report on the movement of the British force, three cavalrymen were captured and thereby interrogated by Ross. The three cavalrymen who were from the 1^st Baltimore Hussars, indicated to Ross that there were close to 20,000 militiamen prepared to defend the approach to Baltimore . Ross unimpressed, stated ‘ “I don’t care if it rains militia” .’29

              At the same time, Brooke arrived with the remainder of the artillery and the 21^st Regiment. Ross and Cockburn had completed their breakfast and noticed that there were incomplete breastworks. This discovery indicated activity by the enemy prior to their arrival. However, the breastworks were mostly thrown-up during a British raid a few months earlier. Stricker wanted to address the fact the British army seemed to be in a relaxed state at the Gorsuch farm and feared a possible strike that night, so he dispatched a force 150 men from the 5^th Regiment consisting of Captain Benjamin Howard’s Mechanical Volunteers and Captain Levering’s Company of Independent Blues along with riflemen from Captain Edward Aisquiths Company of rifles and a few mounted troopers all under the command of Major Richard Heath. Ross continued to advance up the North Point neck; however, this was done without the use of mounted forces that could have provided Ross with adequate intelligence regarding the enemy’s disposition. According to Lieutenant George Robert Gleig, firing had broken out. “Though, from its running and irregular sound, it promised little else than a skirmish; but whether it was kept up by detached parties alone, or by the outposts of a regular army, we could not tell; because, from the quantity of wood with which the country abounded, and the total absence of all hill or eminences, it was impossible to discern what was going on.”30

               It was after 1:00 p.m. when Ross moved on with an advanced reconnaissance party leaving the rest of the light brigade some distance to the rear. Ross held up his advance in order for the rest of the brigade to come together. At this point the American advanced guard opened up on them and Ross’s men returned fire. Ross sent word for Brooke to move forward with all possible haste and even began to ride to the rear in order to meet Cockburn’s arrival. Suddenly, the American line commenced firing again and Ross toppled from his horse. Ross was shot through the right arm and the round logged itself in the chest cavity. Gleig states the “we were already drawing near to the scene of action, when another officer came at full speed towards us, with horror and dismay in his countenance, and calling loudly for a surgeon.”31 Gleig did not want to believe what he knew inside might have just occurred. However, Gleig went on to say that he, “soon realized; for the aide-de-camp had scarcely passed, when the General’s horse, without its rider, and with the saddle and housings stained with blood, came plunging onwards.”32

               Although there is much speculation as to who fired the shot that killed Ross, one thing is for sure; the mortal wounding of Ross had a profound effect on the rest of the army. Gleig stated, “It is impossible to conceive the effect which this melancholy spectacle produced throughout the army. By the courteousness and condescension of his manners, General Ross had secured the absolute love of all who served under him.”33  As Ross was dying, he did not want his men to lose their high morale, and therefore, asked to be covered thereby hiding his wounds. Cockburn was nearby and Ross handed him a locket that he pulled from his tunic. Handing the locket to Cockburn he told him to ‘ “give this to my dear wife, and tell her I commend her to my King and country” .’34

                Command was now handed over to Colonel Arthur Brooke due to Ross’s death. Brooke was a brave officer and considered to be rather cautious. The fact remains that, in the end, Brooke was successful because he drove Stricker’s brigade from the field. As Brooke began to advance his force, he deployed his light troops in a skirmish order in which the men were positioned in a line by two in order to always have one man loaded. As Brooke’s skirmish line was providing security, the rest of the Brigade prepared for an assault on Stricker’s line. Brooke was able to observe Stricker’s flanks covered on both sides by bodies of water. Brooke was able to determine that Stricker had his force deployed in a line with artillery. Stricker’s force was given cover due to its position in the tree line along with wooden paling to the front. As the light brigades skirmishers advance, they came under fire from the Baltimore Yagers under the command of Philip B. Sadtler. They were positioned in a log house of a nearby farm. Behind the force of skirmishers was the first of two lines. The second brigade made up the main line with the third forming a reserve.35  Brooke’s cautious manner appeared because he believed Stricker had more troops at his disposal than he actually had. Brooke decided to make an attempt to turn Stricker’s left flank by dispatching the 4^th Regiment under the command of Major Alured D. Faunce. To cover the flanking maneuver, Brooke deployed his rockets and artillery and they began to fire into Stricker’s line. Brooke also hoped that the rockets would distract Stricker from the turning movement. Stricker utilized his artillery in order to suppress that of Brooke’s. As the American line was returning counter-battery fire, Brooke’s Royal artillery along with Royal Marine rockets were smashing Stricker’s line. At this point the flanking maneuver was almost complete and at the same time the Yagers, under Sadtler, were being driven from a rush made by the Brooke’s light troops.36

               As the 2^nd brigade began to form a line behind the continuous screen of skirmishers, the Royal Naval landing party and Marines on the far left with the 85^th on the right and the 44^th to the far right. The 21^st regiment was kept in a column with the possibility of punching a whole through Stricker’s center, while another contingent of Marines were to the left of the artillery and rocket batteries, a short distance to the right of the Bouldin’s Farm behind the column of the 21^st . As dictated in General John Stricker’s report to Samuel Smith, the 5^th and 27^th Regiments were to bare the brunt of the British assault supported by artillery deployed on Long Log Lane. The 39^th was posted to the left of the road and the 51^st to the right about three hundred yards to the rear of the main line. The Sixth Regiment was in reserve. 37

              Gleig’s regiment, the 85^th , was halted before making the main assault in order to provide time for the 4^th Foot to move around Stricker’s left. A half an hour had passed when the main British line began to move, at which point they were greeted by a thunderous barrage of grapeshot from the American artillery. Gleig stated that as he advanced he was carrying a haversack filled with biscuits that was suddenly struck by grape shot. Although his biscuit were totally destroyed, nevertheless, it saved his life.38 Colonel Arthur Brooke gave the order for the Royal artillery and Marine rocket batteries to commence firing on Stricker’s line with the purpose of distracting him from the 4^th Foot’s flanking mission. Stricker’s Union artillery posted in the center of his line tried to counter the British artillery. As Brooke’s main line began to advance, they were met with canister from Stricker’s gunners who were now facing the threat of an on-coming line of infantry. Brooke states that the enemy’s “fire, when within about 100 hundred yards, was so destructive, and thinning our Ranks so much, that I ordered the whole Line to “advance in quick time.”39  Brooke was hoping to close with the enemy in order to deploy the bayonet.

              With rockets flying overhead of Stricker’s line the light infantry contingent were preparing to secure the log house from the Yaegers that Sadtler ordered torched before they could do so. Stricker noticed the British concentration on his left flank and deployed his second line. The 39^th regiment was placed to the left of the 27^th and with two guns placed on the 39^th’s left that were detached from the Union Artillery in the center. The 51^st took up a position in an oblique manner in order to refuse the line from a flanking movement. The 51^st left was anchored on the Bread and Cheese Creek. As the British 4^th Foot was negotiating rather marshy ground, the Maryland 51^st regiment that was to be posted on the left of the two guns in order to prevent a flanking attack was unsure of itself in terms of how to execute the maneuver. Stricker’s aide-de-camp, Major George Pitt Stevenson had to move to instruct the 51^st as to how they must form their line. Unfortunately, Stricker states that the 51^st “delivered one random fire and retreated precipitately, and in such confusion, as to render every effort of mine to rally them ineffective.” 40The 51^st, under the command of a Lieutenant Colonel Henry Amey, fell back and with them, took part of the 39^th regiment with them; thereby, leaving Stricker’s left exposed to the oncoming 4^th Foot. 

             Stricker, determined to remain in the fight, reformed his line and went muzzle-to-muzzle with the British regulars for about an hour. Stricker, who was now under-strength, pulled his line back and reformed on his reserve regiment the 6^th Maryland in the vicinity of Cook’s Tavern. There is some speculation as to what occurred at Cook’s Tavern. In Christopher T. George’s Terror on the Chesapeake: The War of 1812 on the Bay, a Corporal from the 5^th Regiment named John McHenry states that the 6^th Regiment had retreated before they were engaged. The irony is that the flanking attack spawned the panic on Stricker’s left, never materialized due to the terrain in which the 4^th Foot was encumbered. By now, Stricker had moved his men back beyond Cook’s Tavern. Brooke had halted, for he did not know what was ahead of him and also his men were exhausted.   Although, Stricker had moved off the field. Nevertheless, it was a hard fought engagement by both sides. Brooke was able to claim victory however; Stricker’s men could credit themselves with standing their ground as opposed to the events at Bladensburg during the advance on Washington .  British lost 46 men killed while 295 were wounded. About 24 Americans were killed and 139 wounded along with 50 captured.41    As evening came, Brooke needed to assess the situation before another attack could be made. However, being that this was a joint land and naval attack, it is imperative for Brooke to ascertain the naval aspect of the operation.

           Cochrane noticed that the works on Hampstead Hill, although bustling with those preparing to defend it, seemed thin not as deep. Perhaps with enfilade fire from the water it could be turned. In a letter to General Ross, he prepared detail plans as to how he was going to assault the position from the water. Bomb crafts and barges would be utilized to neutralize Fort McHenry and perhaps by moving into the Papatsco River , the British could take out the enemy earthworks. Cochrane believed that a combined assault would drive the enemy away. An enemy in which they cared for very little. Upon finding out about the death of Ross, Cochrane forward the plans to Colonel Brooke. Although Brooke would stop the attack that night prior to making a pell-mell assault on the breastworks, the attack on Fort McHenry would rage.42

             As Sam Smith pulled back his forces, preparations were underway for an all-out assault on the earthworks of Hampstead Hill. In order to prevent the British fleet from entering the harbor and possibly laying down enfilade fire on Hampstead Hill, the shipping merchants from the city sunk the their vessels thereby creating an impenetrable obstacle for the Royal Nay. The defenders of Baltimore would pass the night anxiously awaiting the events that were to take place in the coming the morning. As the rain poured throughout the night, the bombardment of Fort McHenry continued. Major Armistead, the fort’s commander, along with his garrison held-out and as the sun rose the Royal Navy noticing that the fort and its defenders were still in-place, called of the bombardment of the fortification. Cochrane wrote to Cockburn in regards to whether a ground attack should be made on the earthworks. Both Cochrane and Cockburn decided it was up to Brooke to make that decision. Brooke stated in his diary that “ ‘if I took the place, I should have been the greatest man in England . If I lost, my military character was gone for ever.’ ”43 Cockburn urged Brooke to move forward with the attack; however, Brooke determined that he did not have the proper amount of forces necessary to carry the position and without the proper support of the navy, the attack would fail. Given the situation, it does not seem possible that Brooke’s contingent would have been able to take the heights. With limited field artillery, an army that had already taken casualties in the previous day’s fight and the lack of naval support, any attack made would have met with failure. Overall, it could be argued whether or not the attack made on Fort McHenry was as aggressive as could be, nevertheless the British walked having lost a first-rate combat leader in Major-General Robert Ross.